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Abstract 
This study analyzes how rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) in Senegal were able 
to overcome the collective action dilemma, maintain institutional performance, and remain 
sustainable over time.  This study models cooperation among members as well as the 
performance and sustainability of associations using data collected from field research conducted 
in Dakar, Senegal in 2001.  The results show that factors such as homogeneity of individuals 
within an association, how long the association has existed, how defaults are covered, and rules 
such residency requirements, individual contributions, and rotation order are to various degree 
critical to the performance and sustainability of ROSCAs and to the fostering of cooperation 
among members of these associations.   
Introduction 
The credit shortage in many less-developing countries has been the subject of debate in the 
economic development literature. In Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), many economies have 
deteriorated over time severely affecting the emergence of strong formal financial institutions. 
As a result, a dual system, where both formal and informal institutions coexist, characterizes the 
financial markets in these countries. The formal financial sector that emerged during the colonial 
period grew to include central banks, commercial, development, saving banks, and insurance 
companies. These institutions, however, are not well suited to serving the needs of the poor for 
several reasons. They are less accessible to the poor because they require collateral, do not 
recognize the importance of household savings, and may require some literacy and credit history. 
Banks in these countries are often reluctant to finance small projects such as micro-enterprises 
and are less likely to offer credit to low-income clientele such as women.  
This has offered a tremendous opportunity for informal financial institutions to fill the 
demand for credit in many countries. The poor often use individual and household savings for 
most investments such as micro-enterprises, other business ventures in the informal sector, or for 
personal uses such as children’s education. Often these resources are insufficient, so the poor 
must also rely on informal credit sources available through individuals such as pawnbrokers, 
moneylenders, or extended family members. Another important source of informal savings and 
credit are rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs). These sources of credit usually are 
not regulated and operate independently of governmental controls. These informal sources have 
provided desperately needed credit when no other credit alternatives are available through formal 
financial institutions.   
A rotating savings and credit association (ROSCA) is an “[a]ssociation formed upon a 
core of participants who agree to make regular contributions to a fund which is given, in whole 
or in part, to each contributor in rotation” (Ardener 1964, p.201). Rotating savings and credit 
associations (ROSCAs) are a classic example of a traditional type of mutual aid or solidarity 
associations and provide an intriguing context to understand collective action. In these 
organizations, members cooperate to provide collective benefits that each participant receives in 
turn (Lewis; March and Taqqu; Putnam; Smale and Ruttan). Thus, a participant may become a 
lender or a borrower during a cycle depending on at which stage he or she takes the pot. 
Some scholars predicted that these types of informal "middle rung" institutions would 
eventually whither away as countries achieved economic development (Geertz; Schrader). 
However, rather than fading away, informal financial institutions such as ROSCAs have emerged 
to fill an existing credit gap and continue to play a greater role in the lives of poor people all over 
the world. These institutions are embedded with values, norms, and customs of societies such as 
self-help, mutual aid and interdependence, and decentralized decision-making and provide not 
only economic but social benefits as well (Germidis, Kessler, and Meghir; Narayan).  
Remarkably, these associations are able to overcome the collective action dilemma and 
institutions are designed to provide incentives for members to cooperate (Putnam).  
There has been a lot of debate on the role and importance of informal institutions in 
economic development, especially, in building economic and social capital in developing 
countries. However, empirical studies on ROSCAs in Senegal are currently limited and there is 
still much that is not known about how these institutions organize and operate, how they have 
survived over time, and how they apply different mechanisms to achieve cooperation among 
their members. Many ROSCAs in Senegal have been sustainable for an entire round and often  
continue to repeat rounds for several years. So then, what are the underlying reasons that can 
explain how or why the participants join and continue to cooperate? If the logic of collective 
action assumes that members will behave rationally in ways that are not beneficial to the group 
as a whole, then why does default and free riding occur less often than expected? How have 
individuals designed self-governing institutions to maximize cooperation among members as 
well as improve the sustainability and performance of their institutions?  This study is 
particularly interested in discovering the answers to these questions.  
 
Informal Financial Institutions and Collective Action 
Numerous have looked at issues such as local governance, public good dilemmas, and 
institutional management in a variety of situations and have addressed how individuals were able 
to cooperate and enforce rules. Ostrom (1990) and in her collaborative work Ostrom, Gardner, 
and Walker try to understand the general conditions which explain why some self-organized 
institutions have been successful while others have not.  Based on case studies of common-pool 
resources (CPRs) in various countries, she examines the institutional designs and individual 
incentives to try to identify both the internal and external factors that can facilitate or hinder self-
governance. She concludes  successful collective action is dependent upon how these 
organizations cope with free-riding, solve commitment problems, arrange for the supply of new 
institutions, and monitor individual compliance with sets of rules” (Ostrom 1990). This is 
particularly important in the context of this study as it may help to understand how individual 
women have been able to create self-governing institutions such as ROSCAs that have been 
sustainable for several years.   
Olson’s seminal work, The Logic of Collective Action has sparked a heated and 
contentious debate since its publication.  Although, his works concentrate primarily on interests 
groups, the power of his theory on collective action is its wide applicability in a variety of 
situations.  Most relevant for this study is the ongoing debate over Olson’s conclusions about the 
effect of group size and an organization’s ability to mobilize for collective action. Olson 
hypothesized that increases in group size would hinder collective action because there is a 
greater opportunity for freeriding.   
Marwell and Ames question Olson’s conclusions and highlight interest heterogeneity and 
resource distribution within groups rather than just group size as important factors in groups’ 
ability in providing a public good.  In an experimental study, the authors do not support Olson’s 
argument about the relationship between group size and collective action.  Their conclusions are 
further refined in Oliver, Marwell, and Texeira in their theory on the role of a “critical mass” of 
individuals needed for collective action.  Finally, Marwell and Oliver reiterate the role of a 
critical mass that has the possibility to create a “snowball effect” to help commit others to greater 
effort as well as stress the importance social ties from Oliver, Marwell, and Texeira.   
Ostrom (1999) also challenges Olson’s conclusions and points out several contradictory 
collective action examples that highlight the importance of looking at the context of the 
collective action dilemma.  She notes there are several ideas to keep in mind such as the type of 
collective action, the individuals involved, as well as group attributes such as group size and 
rules-in-use.  Most important for this paper is her discussion on group size and she criticizes 
others for concluding increased transaction costs for larger groups prevents collective action 
because the effect of group size relies on several other variables. She offers the idea that larger 
groups are better able to provide collective goods because they have more resources available.  
Olson assumed smaller groups could overcome the collective action dilemma because 
individual contributions would become more important.  In these groups, members are more 
willing to carry the burden provision because they know they will have a larger benefit, 
transaction costs to coordinate and organize members were fewer, and social incentives are more 
effective compared to larger groups.  Udéhn argues Olson conflates the idea that small (large) 
groups are always privileged groups and an inverse relationship between individual benefits from 
collective goods and group size exists.  He highlights several important studies that undermine 
Olson’s theory demonstrating cooperation in large groups is possible and criticizes the theory for 
failing to consider the role of the individual.  
Udéhn argues that transaction costs do not increase, but decrease as a function of group 
size and reaffirms the necessity of a critical mass, and social ties, or networks in order for 
collective action to succeed.  Frohlich and Oppenheimer also conclude the idea that larger groups 
have a greater problem with free riding is incorrect and point out important variables not 
considered such as differences in individuals’ value of the good, supply costs, and the type of 
good.   
ROSCAs have been able to avoid many of the high transaction costs associated with 
formal financial institutions.  For example, ROSCAs through various monitoring and sanctioning 
mechanisms can minimize the costs of screening new borrowers by capitalizing on local 
information about individuals’ past behavior.  In addition, reputations and the self-selection of 
members help these institutions reduce adverse selection and moral hazard problems.  High rates 
of interaction, proximity and effective mechanisms such as first, second, and third-party 
enforcement make it easier for mutual monitoring among members to occur and helps ensure that 
the benefits of cooperating minimize the temptation to default. Social capital such as shared  
norms, networks of relationships, and trust are important factors that explain how these 
institutions have been able to remain sustainable. With respect to the impact of group size on 
collective action, a critical mass of individuals and how associations affect social capital requires 




The data used in this study is based on field research conducted in Dakar, Senegal between 
February and August 2001. The information was collected following a stratified cluster sampling 
method. First, a random selection of ten suburbs in the Dakar region was drawn using a city map 
provided by the Ministry of Urbanism and Housing. Second, random samples of unequal sizes 
were drawn from each of the ten pre-selected suburbs to provide background information on 
participants and their associations. A total of 153 individuals belonging to different ROSCAs 
were interviewed and 118 were retained for the analysis.  
For the purpose of this study, which focuses on the associations, information about the 
type of organization, size, membership criteria, operation of the association, contributions, 
utilization of receipts, and mechanisms used within the associations to handle disputes and 
facilitate cooperation among members are retained. A detailed description of the variables is 
provided in table 1. Data transformations such as generating dummy variables from the 
categorical variables were conducted on these data as needed in the analysis.  
 
Summary Statistics of the Variables Used in the Study  
Descriptive analysis using central tendency and frequency distributions were conducted to 
generate a typology of ROSCAs in Senegal. On average, a ROSCA in Senegal has a total of 53 
members and has operated for approximately 56 months. The average monthly pot and 
contribution level of approximately was 312,801 fcfa and 6,624 fcfa, respectively. As expected, 
the default rate among ROSCAs is relatively low at 2.4 percent. As in other countries, the results 
showed women are the primary participants in ROSCAs in Senegal with 93 percent of all 
participants. In instances where male participants are found, there are more likely to belong to 
mixed gender associations.   
  Although there is strong belief especially among Senegalese men that women use the 
money they win to finance lavish ceremonies such as weddings, less than 2 percent of the 
ROSCAs were created specifically for these or other types of ceremonies and only 11 percent of 
the respondents used their money for ceremonial purposes.  ROSCAs are commonly savings, 
mutual aid, or a combination of these two types.  The vast majority of associations found in 
periurban Senegal were combination associations.  Their purpose was to provide mutual aid as 
well as an opportunity for members to accumulate savings.   
  In 84 percent of the cases studied, members stated in their associations, individuals made 
equal contributions.  Nearly half (45 percent) of the ROSCAs required members to contribute 
their share on a monthly basis, with the next popular option was either weekly (25 percent) or bi-
monthly contributions (14 percent).  Fifty-seven percent of members were allowed to share a 
hand whereas the other 42 percent of the ROSCAs did not allow two or more members to share a 
hand. 
  Winners were chosen by lottery 73 percent of the time.  However, when asked which 
position they preferred in a rotation, an overwhelmingly number of members (40 percent) stated  
they wanted to be the last person to receive the pot.  Only 10 percent wanted to be in the first 
position and half of the respondents interviewed wanted to be in the middle position. This is an 
unexpected finding because most theoretical studies have argued the best position is the first 
position because the person in essence receives an interest-free loan.  Those in the last position 
are in the least favorable position because this position makes the individual a lender for the 
entire length of the cycle.  
If a member failed to make their contribution and/or did not make their payment on time, 
they were considered in “default”.  Oftentimes this meant the winner would go home with an 
incomplete pot.  Nearly 40 percent of the associations had no known mechanism to cover these 
missing funds.  Twenty-eight percent of the time, missing contributions were supposed to be 
covered with the funds the association collected from fines or group funds. In another 20 percent 
of the times, the gestionnaire or president was required to cover missing contributions with their 
own money.  As predicted, associations experienced less default than expected. Close to 70 
percent of the associations successfully avoided defaults.  Out of those that did experience 
defaults, the majority of these defaults (18 percent) were with members who had already 
received the pot and failed to contribute thereafter. 
 
Multivariate Analysis 
This section models the cooperation, performance, and sustainability of ROSCAs in Senegal 
with a set of variables that reflects group size, group heterogeneity, norms, and other various 
institutional designs. Cooperation among members is measured by the absence of default at any 
given time. The probabilistic nature of default led to the use of a logistic regression to model 
cooperation among members. The independent variables group size (STONT) is specified in a  
quadratic format to reflect the notion of critical mass discussed in the previous section. A similar 
specification is used for duration (DURAT) to capture the behavior of cooperation among 
members as the cycle length increases. That is, cooperation may suffer as cycle length increases; 
however, members who were able to cooperate successfully during a cycle were more likely to 
cooperate in future rounds. Group homogeneity was a critical factor for cooperation as discussed 
earlier. The indicators of homogeneity were the gender composition of the association illustrated 
by DGEND to indicate whether an association is of mixed gender or otherwise, the age disparity 
between participating members (AGECOMP), and whether the participating members were 
required to be from the same locality such as from the same village of origin (DLOCALE2), or 
the same neighborhood (DLOCALE3). Norms and rules of ROSCAs are illustrated by variables 
indicating whether members were allowed to share a hand (SHAND), and whether the rotation 
order is arranged or random (RORDER). Institutional design illustrated by whether defaults were 
covered (DCOV) and the required contribution level to participate (CLEVEL). The same 
variables are used to estimate the performance and sustainability of the ROSCAs.  
  The results of the logistic regression are summarized in table 2. The results indicate the 
duration, size, age composition, and whether members were allowed to share a hand were critical 
determinants of cooperation among members. There are clear indications defaults were more 
likely to occur as the duration of the ROSCAs increased, however the fact that the coefficient on 
the squared of duration (SDURAT) is significant and negative shows that individuals who were 
able to cooperate after a certain time are more likely to cooperate in future rounds. Consequently, 
defaults were less likely to occur for ROSCAs that existed for some time. The variable SHAND 
presents some interesting features. This variable is an indicator of cooperation between two 
members who decided to share a hand in order to participate because they could not individually  
afford the contribution level set by the association. The results suggest defaults are more likely to 
occur when individuals were allowed to share a hand. The variables STONT and SSTONT were 
both significant. The fact that the coefficient of STONT was negative, while SSTONT was 
positive illustrates there is an optimal group size or critical mass above which cooperation among 
members is likely to suffer. Lastly, the results indicate there is no indication those participants in 
associations that require members to be from the same neighborhood or share a hometown were 
more likely to cooperate than those who participated in associations without the same 
requirements. Similarly, there is no indication members of associations that devised strategies to 
cover defaults were more likely to cooperate compared to those who were members of 
associations without such mechanisms. There is no difference in terms of membership 
cooperation between associations that proceed by lottery to allocate funds and those operating 
with an arranged rotation order.  
  Regarding ROSCAs performance, a log-linear regression with default rate as an indicator 
of performance was used. The higher the default rate, the less effective was the association. 
Thus, any variable had a positive and direct relationship with default rate was considered to 
affect ROSCAs performance. The results in table 3 suggest that duration (DURAT), the 
availability of coverage (DCOV), and the size of the ROSCA (STONT) all contribute to 
increases in the default rate.  If the length of the rotation increased by one additional month, then 
the default rate increased by 0.58 percent.  Furthermore, the default rate increased by 0.41 
percent for each additional member if the other variables were held constant.  Finally, 
associations without any coverage for defaults had a 0.24 percent higher default rate than those 
with some type of coverage available.  Meanwhile, default rates were lower for same gender  
associations, associations with higher contribution levels, and those that allowed members to 
share a hand.  
  In the past, scholars have debated the sustainability of rotating savings and credit 
associations. The sustainability of ROSCAs in Senegal is modeled using the number of cycles as 
indicator. It is important to point out the number of cycles is considered as a continuous variable 
rather than count variable and is estimated using a semi-log model. The results in table 4 suggest 
neighborhood and hometown ROSCAs were less likely to continue in future rounds compared to 
those that did not require members to be from a specific locality as a requirement in order to 
participate.  Moreover, the higher the age disparity between participating members, the less 
likely the association would proceed in the future for repeated rounds.  Meanwhile, ROSCAs that 
operated with an arranged rotation were more likely to repeat rounds in the future and thus more 
sustainable than those that operated through a lottery allocation.   
 
Conclusion 
This analysis shows that certain factors such as group homogeneity, rules about individuals’ 
contributions and residency, and certain association characteristics such as the length of 
existence and association size were important variables that enhanced cooperation and reduced 
the likelihood that default would occur.  The length of existence of an association, whether 
coverage was available to cover default, and the association size all worked to erode institutional 
performance while the member homogeneity, individual contribution levels, and whether sharing 
a hand was allowed appear to enhance performance. Finally, those institutions that did not have a 
residency requirement to belong to an association, members who are closer in age to each other, 
and arranged rotation orders were more likely to be sustainable over time.    
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Table 1. Description of the Variables Used in the Analysis.
Variables Definition 
AGECOMP  Indicates the age dispersion between participants within ROSCAs  
APOT  Size of the pot in fcfa 
DURAT  Indicates how long the association has existed  (months) 
STONT Indicates  the  size of the association 
CLEVEL  Amount of money contributed each month by individual members  
DEFEXIST Dichotomous  variable indicating whether any members defaulted in the past 
(yes = 1, no =0) 
DEFRATE  Ratio of number of defaults to size of the association in percent  
COVDEV Categorical  variable  that indicates how defaults are covered (0 = emergency 
funds, 1 = association funds, 2 = collected fines, 3 = president of the 
association, 4 = other volunteers, 5 = no coverage available) used to create 
DCOV (0 = no coverage and 1 = coverage) 
REDEF  Reason for default (0 = no default, 1 = financial winning the pot, 2 = financial 
after winning the pot, 3 = other reason) 
   
 




TTYPE  Type of ROSCAs (0 = saving, 1 = mutual aid, 2 = ceremonies, 3 = credit, 4 = 
combination of two or more from above) 
LOCALE  Residency requirement to participate (0 = no residency requirement, 1 = 
member must reside in the neighborhood, 2 = member must be from the same 
hometown) used to create two dummy variables DLOCALE2 for neighborhood 
ROSCAs and DLOCALE3 for hometown ROSCAs 
GENCOMP  The gender composition of the association (0 = female only, 1 = male only, 2 = 
mixed gender) 
CONTYP  Type of contribution allowed (0 = money, 1 =combination of money and goods) 
ECONT Indicates  if  contribution levels are equal (0 = unequal, 1 = equal) 
SHAND  Indicates whether participants are allowed to share hand (0 = no, 1 = yes)  
FRECONT  Frequency of contributions (0 = weekly, 1 = biweekly, 2 = monthly, 3 = daily, 5 
= other)  
RORDER  Rotation order (0 = arranged, 1 = lottery)  















Notes: The dependent variable is whether a default has ever occurred in the association for which 
yes = 1 and no = 0. The probability for default to occur is an indicator of cooperation among 
members. Any variables for which the significance is less than 0.10 is considered to have an 
impact on the dependent variable. 
 
Variables Label  Coefficients  Std  Error  Significance 
DURAT Duration    2.858  1.362  0.036 
SDURAT Squared  duration  -0.336  0.187  0.072 
DLOCALE2 Neighborhood  ROSCA  -0.596  0.685  0.385 
DLOCALE3 Hometown  ROSCA  -0.124  0.668  0.852 
DGEND  Same gender ROSCA  -0.497  0.505  0.324 
AGECOMP Age  dispersion  0.637  0.397  0.109 
DCOV Coverage  available  -0.748 0.474  0.115 
SHAND Share  hand  allowed  1.110  0.520  0.033 
STONT  Size of ROSCA  -3.928  1.448  0.007 
SSTONT  Square of size of ROSCA  0.516  0.200  0.010 
RORDER  Arranged rotation order  0.199  0.536  0.711 
CLEVEL Contribution  level  -0.122  0.205  0.553  
Table 3. Linear Regression for ROSCAs’ Performance.  
Variables Label  Coefficients  Std  Error  Significance 
CONSTANT   Intercept  -0.292  0.849  0.732 
DURAT Duration    0.582  0.237  0.016 
DGEND  Same gender ROSCA  -0.065  0.039  0.093 
AGECOMP Age  dispersion  -0.054  0.179  0.764 
DCOV Coverage  available  0.240 0.129  0.066 
SHAND Share  hand  allowed  -0.348  0.175  0.049 
STONT  Size of ROSCA  0.411  0.176  0.022 
CLEVEL Contribution  level  -0.349  0.114  0.003 
Notes: The dependent variable measures the default rate which is an indicator of performance. 
Any variables for which the significance is less than 0.10 is considered to have an impact 
ROSCAs’ performance. R
2 = 0.21  
Table 4. Linear Regression for ROSCAs’ Sustainability. 
Variables Label  Coefficients  Std  Error  Significance 
CONSTANT Intercept    2.456  2.127  0.251 
DLOCALE2 Neighborhood  ROSCA  -1.821  0.681  0.009 
DLOCALE3 Hometown  ROSCA  -1.533  0.683  0.027 
DGEND  Same gender ROSCA  -0.055  0.509  0.914 
AGECOMP Age  dispersion  -1.196  0.348  0.001 
DCOV Coverage  available  0.412 0.472  0.384 
SHAND Share  hand  allowed  -0.221  0.511  0.666 
SSTONT  Square of size of ROSCA  -0.264  0.535  0.623 
RORDER  Arranged rotation order  0.546  0.224  0.016 
CLEVEL Contribution  level  2.456  2.127  0.251 
Notes: The dependent variable measures the number of cycles which is an indicator of 
sustainability. Any variables for which the significance is less than 0.10 is considered to have an 
impact ROSCAs’ sustainability. R
2 = 0.22. 
 
 
 
 
 